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“The intractable economic, social, and even philosophical problems
presented by public welfare assistance programs
are not the business of this Court.”
Supreme Court of the United States,
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 488 (1970).

The U.S. Court decisions on the Equal Protection Clause after Brown
v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) that did not figure so prominently
in the historiography of civil rights but which may have still become canon
proper to law may serve us well in the search for global constitutional
canon.

The U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in 1970 in a prominent case

serves as the main focus of my paper. I will briefly describe the decision
and its context, and then present the opposing arguments and how these
are reflected in the decision.

Finally, the underlying approaches in the

above arguments will be discussed, in light of their philosophical
background assumptions where I restate the case, as clearly establishing a
legal schema 1 significant for comparative law.
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Summary of the Case and Opinion
In Dandridge v. Williams 2, Williams was one of two large Baltimore
families in this case on the Social Security Act 3 and U.S. Constitutional
Equal Protection Clause 4. An earlier District Court decision had validated
a claim to equal Aid to Families With Dependent Children (AFDC) benefits
for children against the State’s taking away, by use of a contested state
regulation, benefits to the seventh child or additional later children.

In

Dandridge v. Williams, the Supreme Court reviewed this District Court
decision.

While these benefits ultimately were retained for the later

children in those families, it was not due to the Court recognizing any
absolute right in the economic and social field, as the quote beginning this
paper relating to public welfare assistance programs explicitly states.
These mere pecuniary benefits, curtailed by the State regulation, would
only be restored later by the State of Maryland when the regulation was
changed. The Supreme Court’s tepid reception of the arguments for these
rights stands in stark relief next to the Court’s recognition of the large
family’s inherent “greater ability … to accommodate their needs to
diminished [benefits] due to economies of scale” 5 under a maximum benefit

Supreme Court of the United States. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
United States, Social Security Act of 1935, Title IV (42 U.S.C.A. § 301 et seq): Grants to
States for Aid to Dependent Children Appropriation.
4 United States. Equal Protection Clause: Article XIV (the Fourteenth Amendment): The
Equal Protection Clause, ratified on July 9, 1868.
5 Supreme Court of the United States. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 480 (1970). Supreme
Court Reporter, West Publishing Company, 90 S. Ct. 1153 (1970), at 1159.
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provision. Ironically, the State only voluntarily changed the regulation to
grant equal benefits to the seventh child.
The Supreme Court in the above-quoted decision wrote that it
recognized the “conflicting claims of morality and intelligence of almost
every measure, certainly including the one before us.” 6

There is no

shortage of ideas for social welfare programs; the literature being rife with
examples just cited in Dandridge v. Williams 7, from the specialized fields of
sociology or other human sciences; nor dearth of these “conflicting claims
of morality” from the field of moral philosophy.
The progressive agenda addressed the difficult economic and social
problems for which the Court declined to prescribe solutions.

When it

came to deciding upon the allocation of resources by a restricting state
within society, the Court limited its decision to how far equality extended
in the provision of welfare benefits, as we will see later. In so deciding,
the Court’s implication was that if the individual or family could save for
its needs, the larger family was peculiarly capable of this.

Supreme Court of the United States. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 488 (1970). Supreme
Court Reporter, West Publishing Company, 90 S. Ct. 1153 (1970), at 1162.
7Supreme Court of the United States. Dandridge v. Williams. For example, see several studies
from: Brief for Appellees, Index, pp. ix-x; or Reply Brief for the Appellants, Table of
Citations, pp. iii-iv; especially Comment, Compulsory Work for Welfare Recipients Under
the Social Security Amendments of 1967, 4 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Prob. 197 (1968); and Rein,
Choice and Change in the American Welfare System, 1969, The Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science, 89, 109.
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These rough guidelines were not inconsistent with justice theory, for
example Rawls’ theory of justice, 8 which uses the family (rather than the
individual) as the basic unit that matters. To that degree only could the
decision be squared with the liberal argument made by the advocates for
social change in the Court.
1.

The Case for Social Change

Where the State of Maryland contested the invalidation of a grant
maximum in the state AFDC regulation, the authors of the argument for
social change in the case responded, holding to a liberal political theory
and a broad 9, 10 philosophy, that Rawls developed in Theory of Justice into
fundamental principles of justice 11 identified in one writer’s critique as the
“principles that specially designed choosers would adopt for the sake of
regulating society” 12. The attorneys argued that the later children in large

John Bordley Rawls. Theory of Justice. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,
(1971).
9
Bill E. Lawson. In a review of The Limits of Rawlsian Justice by Roberto Alejandro,
Professor Lawson says that the author, in analyzing Rawls, finds that the origins of the
Rawlsian project to have “at its base” the views of both Hobbes and Kant. Choice: Current
Reviews for Academic Libraries, Online, Association of College & Research Libraries, ALA
(American Library Association), October 1998.
10 Roberto Alejandro. The Limits of Rawlsian Justice. John Hopkins University Press, 1998.
11
John B. Rawls, Theory of Justice, p. 53. In the further elaborated original position in
Rawls’ contractualist theory, the members of the system idealized in the theory, without
prejudging the choices they make for principles, represent “the sort of persons that men
want to be,” p. 230.
12 Gerald A. Cohen. “Facts and Principles”, a paper presented in the Workshop in Law,
Philosophy, and Political Theory at the University of California at Berkeley School of Law,
March 13, 2003; p. 42.
8
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families were entitled to the same benefits as the rest of those needy
children. 13
The Legal Aid attorneys in their brief wrote that the provision of
benefits under AFDC to all children in need, along with the Equal
Protection Clause, in the statutory 14 and Constitutional 15 law, respectively,
required giving individuals (roughly) equal benefits.

The briefs for the

Appellees philosophized that entitlement to such equality of benefits
constituted an equal right to life.
The recourse of such authors to philosophical arguments of this
kind while not as common today has a long history, seen in the older
writing of legal scholars. Perhaps because of the discrepancy between the
theory and practice of justice, this underpinning of abstract philosophical
argument is absent in much current practice of law. 16
The result of this argument mixing Rawlsian and other elements of
philosophy with the volatile urban politics of the inner city did not
apparently sway the Court in the latter’s decision and so seemed to lack
immediate significance. The case’s historical importance could be located
in the kind of argument of the parties involved in debating the state
regulation, which would be played out in certain less prominently-situated
Supreme Court of the United States. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 476, 477 (1970).
Supreme Court Reporter, West Publishing Company, 90 S. Ct. 1153 (1970), at 1156 and 1157.
14 Social Security Act.
15 Article XIV.
16 Mark A. Graber, “Constitutional Politics and Constitutional Theory: A Misunderstood
and Neglected Relationship.” (Book review on The Warren Court and American Politics by
Lucas A. Powe, Jr., Harvard University Press, 2000.) 27 Law and Social Inquiry 309 Spring
2002 © American Bar Foundation.
13
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discursive effects. These effects are constituted by the sedimentation 17 of
everyday relations with respect to legality, 18 the latter as epitomized by the
decisions of the Court.
That conceivably the “right to life” 19 could be selectively provided
based upon the child’s relative position in the family order, was a problem.
For the time being, however, there was merely a reverberation in the
Court’s decision of the Appellees’ argument, without agreeing with them
on the state measure as to the question of legality.

The respondents

(Appellees) argue: “When a legislative classification has the effect of
placing such additional burdens on a class of persons characterized by its
extreme poverty and a practical inability to escape from problems which
the

classification

appropriate”. 20

creates,

strict

scrutiny

of

the

classification

is

The Court acknowledged, in citing “intractable …

problems” 21, the difficulty with, without necessarily agreeing with the
inescapability

of,

problems

related

to

public

welfare,

including

philosophical ones.

Michael W. McCann, “Reform Litigation on Trial”, 17 Law & Social Inquiry 715 (1992).
Robert A. Kagan; Martin Krygier; and Kenneth Winston, eds. Legality and Community: On
the Intellectual Legacy of Philip Selznick. Bowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.; and the
Berkeley Public Policy Press, Institute of Governmental Studies, University of California at
Berkeley, 2002.
19
Supreme Court of the United States. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 488 (1970). Supreme
Court Reporter, West Publishing Company, 90 S. Ct. 1153 (1970), at 1163.
20 Supreme Court of the United States. Dandridge v. Williams, Brief For The Appellees.
October Term, 1969, No. 131; Argument I.C.2.b. concerning the Right to Life, p. 44.
21 Supreme Court of the United States. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 488 (1970). Supreme
Court Reporter, West Publishing Company, 90 S. Ct. 1153 (1970), at 1163.
17

18
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2.

The Opposing Case

A quote from the famous dissent of Justice Field and Justice Strong:
By the term ‘life’, as here used, something more is meant
than mere animal existence. The inhibition against its deprivation
extends to all those limbs and facilities by which life is enjoyed.
*** The deprivation not only of life, but of whatever God has
given to everyone with life, for its growth and enjoyment, is
prohibited by the provision in question, if its efficacy be not
frittered away by judicial decision. 22
was cited by Appellees in their response to the State’s initial argument. A
common sense or natural law argument here was applied to a strictly
pecuniary issue about a public regulation.
The State, in opposing, would repeat the allusion to Justice Field’s
dissent with irony in its successful effort to defend the regulation:
“The irony inherent in the use of Justice Field’s words is,
of course, self-evident… The present case in itself is of limited
practical importance... The doctrinal significance of the case is,
however, greater.” 23
As for the other key issue of the argument, the Appellants “do
not accept the suggestion that the validity of the Maryland regulation
under the Social Security Act can be deemed to turn on the question
whether the Maryland regulation “treat(s) the family as the proper unit

Supreme Court of the United States. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 142 (1876). Quoted in
Supreme Court of the United States. Dandridge v. Williams, Brief For The Appellees.
October Term, 1969, No. 131; Argument concerning the Right to Life, p. 42.
23 Supreme Court of the United States. Dandridge v. Williams, Reply Brief For The
Appellants. October Term, 1969, No. 131; Conclusion, on p. 20.
22
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of assistance… it is an approach fully consistent with federal law, which
has traditionally, with some exceptions, adhered to the ‘cash benefit’
principle requiring benefits for a family to be paid in a lump sum to the
family head”. 24 If it had looked like that for official purposes of the
State, in calculating benefits, the seventh “extra child,” was not a
person, this would be a strong argument for change, but any reliance
upon a natural law argument was undermined by more than one
reference to “mathematical nicety,” 25 as perhaps the State caricatured the
ideal of equality being advanced by the advocates, at the Bar, of social
change.
3.

Resolution of the Opposing Sides

If the implication was that the seventh child was not a person (for
the purpose of the Maryland statute), the Court’s majority hinted at the
possibility that he was, by including a few humanizing details 26, repeated
from what was referred to by Appellants, from Appellee’s ‘Statement’
“elaborately recite[d] … facts relating to the individual situations of the
exceptionally circumstanced named plaintiffs.” 27

Alluding to the larger

families’ “greater ability to accommodate their needs to diminished
Supreme Court of the United States. Dandridge v. Williams, Reply Brief For The
Appellants. October Term, 1969, No. 131; Introduction to Argument, p. 2.
25 Supreme Court of the United States. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 485 (1970); as cited
from Supreme Court of the United States, Stuart Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220
U.S.61, 78; 31 S.Ct 337, 340; 55 L.Ed.369.
26 Supreme Court of the United States. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 475, 476 (1970).
Supreme Court Reporter, West Publishing Company, 90 S. Ct. 1153 (1970), at 1156.
27 Supreme Court of the United States; Dandridge v. Williams, Reply Brief For The
Appellants. October Term, 1969, No. 131; Introduction to Argument, p. 1.
24
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benefits” 28, the Court seemed to invoke a theme of the 1960s.

By this

reliance upon poor people’s innate resourcefulness, the Court was able to
avoid either resolving the conflicting claims of morality of such measures
or focusing on design of institutions as a way to address social and
economic problems, as its decision quoted at the beginning of this chapter
explicitly states.
While upholding such maximums where the youngest members of
large families were given no extra allowance, the Court did not explicitly
refer to the family as the proper unit of assistance, and indeed detailed a
set of complex calculations by which it could be understood the proper
unit of assistance was a more nuanced version. If heads of families were
the recipients of these grants, then a “rough accommodation” existed so
far as children in these families were concerned. Equality would mean at
least here, fundamentally, the equal protection of that liberty within which
the accommodating of the family’s needs is made possible, along the lines
of Rawls’ first principle of justice, which states, “Each person is to have an
equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties compatible
with a similar scheme of liberties for others.” 29

This principle takes

precedence in the designing of social institutions.

28
29

Ibid.
John B. Rawls. Theory of Justice. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press (1971), p.53.
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The grant maximums imposed by the state, in the part of the
decision addressing economic “gratuitous” 30 benefits, which was decried by
progressives, would not be subject to the same “strict scrutiny” as
fundamental civil rights, according to the Court’s ruling.

A state can

choose regulation based on welfare economics but without strict
“mathematical nicety.” 31

The Appellants successfully argued against

perceiving the system of economic benefits as “a closed system,” 32 even
though such a system might lend itself to a logical treatment where an
individual’s share could be measured precisely. As for the philosophical
problem, raised by the theory of equal right to life, the Court evinced the
approach of communality as it addressed the family, an approach bolstered
by philosophy from natural law.

____________________

Our main example here poses the “philosophical problem,” in the
quotation at least recognized by the Court. While disavowed as a concern
of the Court, perhaps such a problem can be rooted in its philosophical
foundations.

Then, some insight can be gained into its historical

development in Western law by studying the philosophical problem
Supreme Court of the United States. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 522, (1970). Supreme
Court Reporter, West Publishing Company, 90 S. Ct. 1153 (1970), at 1161.
31 Supreme Court of the United States. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 486, (1970). Supreme
Court Reporter, West Publishing Company, 90 S. Ct. 1153 (1970), at 1180.
32 Supreme Court of the United States. Dandridge v. Williams, Reply Brief For The
Appellants. October Term, 1969, No. 131; Conclusion, on p. 22.
30
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diachronically: the same philosophical problem that may not have been a
concern at that early time of the Court is now a concern.
In the case example, alluding to the larger families’ “greater ability
to accommodate their needs to diminished benefits,” 33 the Court denies an
equal right to benefits while invoking communality. By this reliance upon
poor people’s innate resourcefulness, the Court was able to defer resolving
“the conflicting claims of morality” inherent in the inequality of such
measures in judging the legality of institutions’ way of addressing social
and economic problems.

This communality would demonstrate a set of

philosophical background assumptions, (we contrast this philosophy with
two other philosophical approaches 34, in which the law functions as a
mechanism to regulate the social and economic order, or to mediate
between individuals as in contractarianism), which was applied to the
family, the smallest unit of social organization, and would also reverberate
in the Court’s treatment of the class of welfare recipients as a whole, as the
Court stated 35:
We see nothing in the federal statute that forbids a State
to balance the stresses that uniform insufficiency of payments
would impose on all families against the greater ability of large
families—because of the inherent economies of scale—to
accommodate their needs to diminished per capita payments. The
strong policy of the statute in favor of preserving family units
Supreme Court of the United States. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 480 (1970). Supreme
Court Reporter, West Publishing Company, 90 S. Ct. 1153 (1970), at 1159.
34 Peter J. Steinberger. Ideology and the Urban Crisis. SUNY Press, Albany, New York (1985).
35 Supreme Court of the United States. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 476, 477 (1970).
Supreme Court Reporter, West Publishing Company, 90 S. Ct. 1153 (1970), at 1156 and 1157.
33
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does not prevent a State from sustaining as many families as it
can, and providing the largest families somewhat less than their
ascertained per capita standard of need…
The plaintiffs in this case inhabited twentieth-century urban
America during the social conflagration of the 1960s.

The underlying

philosophy of communality, seemed resonant with the Sixties.

But this

approach has been a theme of earlier history as well, for example, in the
British attitude of salutary neglect toward distant colonial subjects.
The 1970 decision’s directly appealing to the resources of the
community for accommodating unmet needs was no new practice.
Throughout this era frequent reliance on this schema occurred, most
notably in programs such as those under the Office of Economic
Opportunity, 36 harnessing

community

resources

and

receiving

their

inspiration from the civic philosophy that emphasized relying on networks
native to the social group of concern. Grassroots in style, and based on
individual initiative, these programs would inspire such optimistic readings
of the social destiny as The Greening of America 37 and are thus in part
representative of the intellectual forbearers of such movements today.
But in any case, the Court that handed down the 1970’s Williams
decision, through the invoking of the philosophy of integral community,
could be said to be establishing a canonically grounded baseline for what
Steinberger, ibid.
Charles A. Reich, The Greening of America. Excerpts first published in an essay under the
same title in The New Yorker (September 26, 1970) and then published in its entirety in book
form by Random House, NY, 1970.
36
37
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the community 38 could claim to solve for itself:

residual issues after

governmental and courthouse measures had tried their best and failed. The
Courts thus allows such a legal schema as would be exemplified by the
original situation of young Mr. Williams in the eponymous case which
grounds I bring out as the concern now before the Court in this paper.

Restatement of Facts and Case
In the original briefings here it was argued that, the seventh child
deserved the same benefits as the other children, in Dandridge v. Williams
397 U.S. 471 (1970).

The Court accepted the state’s rationale, as not

morally repugnant, under the rubric of “greater economies of scale” as
mitigating inequality.

Thereby, that position of Mr. Williams now as a

child now as a grown adult with his own children though deprived of
assistance provided to others without his “unlucrative” but otherwise
identical position and thus relegated to a certain unequal position, would
not constitute a grave threat to life (those fundamental notions) enunciated
by the Court were characterized by Mr. Williams and protected under the
Fourteenth Amendment.
The philosophical problem, while not hypostatized by the attorneys
as a way to violate such fundamental notions as freedom of speech and
John B. Braithwaite. “A Future Where Punishment Is Marginalized: Realistic or
Utopian?” UCLA [University of California at Los Angeles] Law Review; Volume 46,
Number 6, August 1999.
38
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association, originated in its precise formulation though obviously not
foreseen by, them as preceding some such eventuality. If this is so, the
Court may not have been complicit in the violation, and the attorneys in
establishing inequality in social groups for future role in abridging liberty
within and thereby abusing the trust previously existing therein. The Court
could be said to be affirmatively establishing the moral datum upon which,
in any future adjudication, relations therein would be expected to turn.
That expectation was one of accommodation for the “greater abilities”, in
the Court’s decision noting officially the philosophical problem.

Those

characterized by those problems which a classification, through, e.g., the
increasing reification of “some inequality” Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S.
486 (1970) under that schema should constitute the class for which
protections such as under the strict standard of scrutiny applies.

Further Statement of the Case and Conclusion
If the state, by categories promulgated by the state, productive of
some inequality, has indeed used this inequality in conduct which
trespasses the relations of trust which such an “economy of scale”
assumes, and categorically affronts by fundamental rights violations Mr.
Williams and those like him relegated to this subclass, the recourse would
be to the fundamental notion of the human rights schema latent within the
Court decision.

In court proceedings at the state and federal level,
14

Williams has laid out the philosophical problem as an inescapable
contradiction for the liberty of those who were subject of and
characterized by said problem, and then subjected to that steadfast affront
under color of law.
Without recourse to fundamental notions of constitutionalism no
measures could be taken to ameliorate this affront upon the family, nor
could the system of ill-treatment of the rights of himself or his family
including the children be any way changed at the present time without
returning to the constitutional schema putatively laid out in that decision.
Therefore in propounding this schema as constitutional canon we would be
benefiting Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence where there are current
unresolved problems and grounds for concern.
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